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PARALLEL IMPORTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN SINGAPORE
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF PARALLEL IMPORTS
Parallel imports is a term used to describe a situation where articles made
and sold in one country (the country of manufacture), are imported into
another country (the country of importation), without the consent of the
owner or licensee of the intellectual property rights in the country of
importation. These articles are then sold or otherwise commercially
exploited in the country of importation, in competition with articles
originating from the owner or licensee of the relevant rights therein. The
issue which has arisen concerns the extent to which intellectual property
rights in the country of importation can be used to seal off the domestic
market and repel such imports.
The phenomenon of parallel imports is fundamentally distinct from the
general notion of piracy. The parallel importer is not, as such, a pirate of
intellectual property. Piracy takes place where the articles are manufac-
tured in direct infringement of the intellectual property rights in the
country of manufacture. In the case of parallel imports, the imported
articles, will in general be non-infringing in the country of manufacture.
They will be genuine articles in the sense that they are made and released
into the marketplace, in the country of manufacture, by the owner or
licensee of the intellectual property rights therein.
The intellectual property system in Singapore comprises principally of the
law of patents1, confidence2, copyright3, registered designs4, trade marks5
and passing off6. The system creates qualified monopoly rights over the
protected material. Whilst these rights may vary from one branch of the
system to another, they do in general create rights over commercial
exploitation. The problem of parallel imports arises in the context of the
Singapore operates a patent system whereby United Kingdom patents are received into
Singapore. See Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act, Cap.271, 1985 (Rev. Ed.).
The law of confidence is most likely based on broad equitable principles of good faith. As
such its starting point would be the Second Charter of Justice (Letters Patent issued in
1826 pursuant to Geo. IV c. 85) which imported English Law into Singapore.
See the Copyright Act 1987, Cap. 63, 1988 (Rev. Ed.).
Designs registered in the UK. under the Registered Designs Act 1949 enjoy the like rights
and privileges in Singapore. See United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act, Cap. 339,
1985 (Rev. Ed.).
See the Trade Marks Act, Cap. 332, 1985 (Rev. Ed.).
As a creature of the common law its starting point would again be the Second Charter of
Justice.
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fact that the intellectual property system has to a large extent been
“internationalised,” in the sense that a product may enjoy intellectual
property protection not just in the country of conception, development and
manufacture, but also in a wide range of other “overseas countries.”7 For
example, a literary work which is written and first published in the United
Kingdom or the United States will enjoy copyright under the domestic laws
of numerous countries including Singapore8. Likewise, a new invention is
likely to be patented in several countries9. Similarly, “successful” trade
marks are likely to enjoy goodwill and to be subject to trade mark
registrations in all countries where the product is marketed under that
trade mark10. These rights in the several countries where they are enjoyed
are separate and distinct, and they can be separately assigned or licensed to
different individuals. The owner or the licensee of the rights in Singapore
may be different from the owner or licensee in other territories. The value
of the rights in any given country will depend, in part, on the degree of
exclusivity in the market place conferred by the rights. Parallel imports
tend to erode the exclusivity and hence to “ devalue” the rights. Hence the
battle on parallel imports is enjoined across the entire field of the law of
intellectual property rights. This article will examine the extent to which
parallel imports are allowed in Singapore in the context of the law of
patents, copyright, passing off, trade marks and registered designs. It will
also address briefly the policy considerations that are raised in the debate.
Generally, there is no such thing as an international intellectual property right.
Intellectual property products will however often be protected in several countries under
the national laws of the countries in question. Most of the international conventions on
intellectual property seek to give member countries equal access to the national
intellectual property system of any member country. See, for example, the BERNE
Copyright Convention. Some conventions will also seek to regulate the content of the
intellectual property right that is subject to the Convention. In the case of patents, the
European Patent Convention 1973, inter alia, sets up an European Patent Office in
Munich with power to grant patents for inventions for the member states.
The United States and the United Kingdom are both members of the Universal Copyright
Convention and the BERNE Copyright Union. Numerous other countries are also
members. Under the conventions reciprocity of treatment is a key objective. Singapore is
not yet a member of either convention. She has however recently joined the World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). This could well be a prelude to accession to
the BERNE Convention. In the meantime, Singapore has extended the Copyright Act
1987 to protect copyright material connected with the United States and the United
Kingdom. See s.184 of the Copyright Act 1987 and the Copyright (International
Protection) Regulations 1987 S 110/87 and amendments at S 120/87, S 185/87 & S 262/88.
In the case of Singapore any invention which enjoys patent protection in Singapore will
also enjoy patent protection in the United Kingdom. This is because the Singapore patent
system is currently based on the reception of United Kingdom patents. Inventions
patented in the UK are likely to have been patented in many other territories.
See, for example, the facts in Colgate-Palmolive Ltd. & Anor. v Markwell Finance & Anor
[1989] R.P.C. 497 for an illustration of a trade mark enjoying goodwill and being subject
to trade mark registrations in numerous countries giving rise to difficult issues on parallel
imports.
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II. THE POLICY BACKGROUND
The intellectual property system is today rationalised largely on the basis
that it provides a legal framework for the protection of the economic fruits
of intellectual effort, labour and entrepreneurial investment.11 In this sense
it acts as an incentive system to encourage such activities for the benefit of
society as a whole. In the case of pirated goods, little sympathy for the
pirate usually arises, for the act of piracy directly undermines the incentive
system.12 In the case of parallel imports, the position of intellectual
property right owners are far more problematic. Parallel imports relate to
products that are legitimate in the country of manufacture and first sale in
that they will usually originate from the owner or licensee of the rights in
issue. In many cases, the owner of the rights in the country of manufacture
and in the country of importation will be the same person. Indeed, on
occasions, the licensees may also be the same. In such cases of common
ownership, the following points could be made against the creation of
rights to repel parallel imports. First, the owner of the rights in the country
of importation, will already have secured an economic return in the
country of manufacture, in respect of the articles forming the parallel
imports. This return will be reflected either in the sale price in the country
of manufacture or in the royalty payments under the licence arrangements.
Second, there is the more general point of consent or acquiescence. By
releasing the goods into the market place, it may be plausible, in some
instances, to argue that the owner of the rights has impliedly consented to
the possibility of the goods forming the basis of parallel imports.13 These
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See Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property (1984), paras. 1.6 –1.19. Apart from
economic incentive arguments, justification is also sometimes based on natural justice and
moral rights arguments. See also art. 27 para 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which states: “ Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author”. See also Cornish, Intellectual Property : Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and
Allied Rights (2nd ed., 1989), at paras. 1-004 to 1-020, 3-023 to 3-035, 9-023 to 9-030. See
also Patents in Perspective (J. Phillips Ed. 1985). Note also that the title “Intellectual
Property Rights” represents an ex post facto grouping of different causes of action that
evolved at different times in response to different pressures.
Up to recently, the main complaint of industrialised countries against the developing and
newly industrialised economies of ASEAN, related to basic fundamental issues of
establishing intellectual property law systems which were accessible to foreign intellectual
property right owners. The complaint related to the unauthorised reproduction and
exploitation of inventions, works and trade and service marks. Whilst the problem of
piracy still exists in ASEAN, the issue of parallel imports is increasingly coming into the
picture.
This argument has had some success in patent law. See below and the decision in Betts v
Willmott (1871)L.R. 6 Ch 239. The point has also been raised, but with less success, in
trade mark law and passing off. See Champagne Heidsiek et Cie Monopole Societe
Anonyme v Buxton [1930] 1 Ch. 330, 47 RPC 28 and Colgate - Palmolive Ltd. & Anor. v
Markwell Finance & Anor. [ 1989] RPC 497. In copyright law, arguments based on implied
consent were rejected by the Australian High Court in Time - Life v Interstate Parcel
[1978] F.S.R. 251.
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points could be used to support an exhaustion of rights doctrine based on a
consensual release of the goods into the market place by the owner of the
intellectual property rights. Within the framework of the European
Economic Community, such a notion of exhaustion of rights has been
developed in the larger context of the free movement of goods and services
policy between member states of the Community. This policy is set out
primarily in Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty of Rome.14 One of the objectives
behind the formation of the common market is to promote competition
within the community by removing legal barriers to the movement of goods
and services between Community members.15 Intellectual property rights
carry with them the potential power to divide up and segregate the
individual market places in which the rights are enjoyed, thereby interfer-
ing with the broader Community objective of free movement of goods and
services. Accordingly, the consensual first marketing of goods in a member
state will in general constitute an exhaustion of any relevant intellectual
property right in other member states, at least in so far as such rights might
otherwise be set up to prevent importation. This is so notwithstanding
differences in market conditions or in the content of the intellectual
property rights in the community country of first marketing and in the
community country of importation.16 This European concept of exhaustion
is however confined to trade between member states inter se. It has not
spawned the development of any broader, coherent, concept of exhaustion
of rights in respect of goods first marketed outside of the Community. In
such cases, it is still a matter for the domestic laws of the country of
importation to determine the extent, if any, of exhaustion generated by the
first consensual marketing.17
See also Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome which deal with agreements which might
prevent, restrict or distort competition within the Common Market. Article 86 also
prohibits the abuse of dominant positions within the Common Market which might affect
trade between member states. Due to space constraints this article will not examine the
details of the European concept of exhauation of rights. For a discussion of the concept
see Guy and Leigh, The EEC and Intellectual Property (1981); Cornish, Intellectual
Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (2nd. ed., 1989), at paras.
1–021 to 1–027, 6–011, 7–041–7–048, 12–028–12–031 and 18–001–18–012; Dworkin and
Taylor, Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988, 1989 at p. 104–113.
See Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights,
2nd. Ed., (1989) at paras. 1–021 — 1–027 for a discussion of division of markets within the
EEC..
See Centrafarm v Sterling Drug [1974] E.C.R. 1147 and Musik - Vertieb Membran Gmbh v
GEMA [1981] F.S.R. 433 where differences in patent and trade mark values, respectively,
in the country of first marketing and the country of importation were ignored in coming to
the conclusion of exhaustion.
See Polydor Ltd. v Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. [1982] F.S.R. 358. Imports into UK of
sound recordings made and released in Portugal by the Portuguese subsidiary\licensee of
the owner of the copyrights in Portugal and UK. Portugal was not then a member of the
EEC and accordingly the free movement of goods policy set out in the Treaty of Rome did
not apply. See also Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company & Co v.Geerpres
Europe Limited [1974] R.P.C. 35.
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Owners of intellectual property rights, wearing different spectacles, take a
somewhat different view of the matter. First, the point is often made that
the short term public gains from competitively priced parallel imports are
outweighed by the long term disadvantages. Parallel importers will tend to
concentrate on the more popular works and products that are easily
marketed. They will ignore the less popular works and products with low
profit margins. A glance through the reported cases on parallel imports
shows that products such as toothpaste,18 motor oil,19 hair shampoo,20
television sets,21 champagne,22 records,23 antibiotics,24 analgesics,25
decaffeinated coffee26 and cookery books27 have all been subject to the
perils of parallel imports at one time or another. On the other hand, one
seldom comes across parallel imports of specialist textbooks and other
products which attract only a small market.28 Parallel imports, by com-
peting with the more profitable products in the portfolio of the Singapore
intellectual property rights owner or licensee, will in the long run be
detrimental to the public interest. For example, it must be desirable, in the
general public interest, for publishers of books and record producers to
carry a broad range of material. Not all of the works or recordings will be
commercially successful. Parallel importers by competing with and
reducing the profit margins on the more successful items, reduces the
ability of the publishers and recording companies to carry less popular
items and to take on board new untested authors and artists. Even where
the indigenous publishing and recording industry is small, similar problems
can still arise. Licensed importers and distributors may find their ability to
See Colgate - Palmolive & Anor v. Markwell Finance & Anor. [1989] R.P.C. 497 (
COLGATE Toothpaste from Brazil to UK.).
Castrol v. Automotive Supplies. [1983] R.P.C. 315 ( CASTROL Motor Oil from Canada
to UK.).
Revlon Inc. v. Cripps and Lee [1980] F.S.R. 85 ( REVLON shampoo from the United
States to the UK.).
Sony v Saray Electronics [1983] F.S.R. 302 ( SONY television sets made for the US.
market imported into UK.).
Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe Anonyme v. Buxton [1930] 1 Ch. 330 (
Champagne destined for the French market parallel imported into UK.)
CBS UK. v. Charmdale [1980] 2 All. ER. 807 (sound recordings from the United States to
the UK.)
Sime Darby Singapore Ltd. & Anor. v Beecham Group Ltd. [1968] 2 M.L.J. 161 (
Antibiotic “HETACILLIN” made in the United States and imported into Singapore.)
Winthrop Products Inc. & Anor. v. Sun Ocean (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1988] 2 MLJ 317
(Importation of the drug “ Panadol “ from the UK. to Malaysia)
Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag [1974] E.C.R. 7311 ( Imports of the “Hag” brand of
decaffeinated coffee into Belgian from Germany.)
Time-Life v Interstate Parcel [1978] F.S.R. 251 ( Imports of cookery books from the
United States into Australia.)
To the writer’s knowledge, no empirical research has been carried out on the type of
products that are commonly parallel imported into Singapore. It is likely however that
such activities will be confined mainly to popular brands and products which market
easily.
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stock items of uncertain profitability affected by the general reduction of
profit margins caused by parallel imports. In the case of Singapore, if there
is any substance to these arguments, it is more likely to be found in the
reduced ability of licensees to stock and hold less profitable items.29
Singapore’s domestic publishing and recording industry is still relatively
small. It is unlikely that copies of Singapore “authored” copyright works
made for sale in foreign territories will be parallel imported back into
Singapore in sufficient quantum to threaten the development of an
indigenous publishing and recording industry. More problematic, are the
arguments that parallel imports of copyright material, made for sale and
use in overseas countries, will affect the liability of local licensees and
distributors to hold and stock less popular items at reasonable prices.
Whether this is really so, is, in the absence of empirical research, a matter
of speculation and doubt. What is reasonably clear, is that the popularity of
parallel imports with the public in general, stems from the competitive
pricing of the parallel imports. In terms of the economic benefit argument,
the burder, it is submitted, is on the intellectual property right owners to
prove the economic perils of parallel imports. Their case, it is submitted,
has not yet been made out.
A second argument that is sometimes raised relates to invocation of the
public interest in the name of public safety. Products produced for use in
one country may not necessarily be suitable for use in other countries. For
example, in Castrol v Automotive Supplies30 the defendants imported into
the United Kingdom CASTROL marked motor oil from Canada. Motor
oil produced for use in Canada existed in a number of different viscosity
grades so as to cater for Canadian climatic conditions. Not all of the grades
would be suitable for use in the United Kingdom. If the parallel imports
could not be repelled by the owner of the trade mark rights in the United
Kingdom, members of the public in the United Kingdom could be deceived
into picking the Canadian CASTROL motor oil on the basis that it would
be suitable for use in the United Kingdom.
Similar problems may also arise in the context of after-sales service. The
authorised licensees and distributors within jurisdiction may not be keen
on providing services to parallel imported products. In most cases,
See the representations of The Publishers Association and the Book Development
Council to the Select Committee on the Copyright Bill 1986, Parl.9 of 1986, Paper S.C.
No. 13B which raises these arguments. See also the oral representations of the Book
Development Council at B 34 of the Report of the Select Committee. For a contrary
position, see the representations of the Consumers’ Association of Singapore, Paper S.C.
No.15 and see also the oral representations in favour of parallel imports of the Singapore
Booksellers Association at B 70 of the Report.
[1983] R.P.C. 315.
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manufacturers’ guarantee cards can only be issued by the authorised
dealers.31 On occasions, the parallel importer may try to win sales by
purporting to issue manufacturer guarantee cards. It may even be possible
that some parallel importers will try to provide after sales service when
they are not really competent to do so. Indeed in Sony v Saray
Electronics,32 the parallel importer even tried to modify television sets
made for use in the United States for use in the United Kingdom. Moving
further afield from matters of public safety, there are the problems which
arise generally in the context of qualitative differences in products made
for use in different countries. These differences may not have a direct
bearing on public safety, but nevertheless, the public may be deceived as to
the quality of the product that they are getting33 As will be seen later,
where there are real qualitative differences in the products, or where the
parallel importer attempts to masquerade as the authorised dealer, that the
sympathy of the law is with the intellectual property right owner. In the
absence of such points, it is questionable as to whether a convincing
economic argument, on a broad societal basis, can be made out to justify
repulsion of parallel imports.
III. PATENTS AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
Singapore currently operates a patent by importation system based on
patents registered in the United Kingdom. Section 3 of the Registration of
United Kingdom Patents Act34 provides, inter alia, that:
“Any person being a grantee of a patent in the United Kingdom or any
person deriving his right from the grantee by assignment, transmission or
other operation of law may apply to the Registrar of Patents within
3 years from the date of issue of the patent to have the patent registered
in Singapore....”35
Registration is largely a formality. There is no examination by the
See Sony v. Saray Electronics [1983] F.S.R.302.
[1983] F.S.R.302
See Colgate - Palmolive Ltd. v. Markwell Finance [1989] R.P.C. 497. which involved
parallel imports of “Colgate” toothpaste from Brazil into the United Kingdom. The
Brazilian toothpaste although perfectly safe to use were of lower prophylactic and
cosmetic qualities than those made for use in the UK.
Cap.271 1985 Rev. Ed.
The Registrar has a discretion to accept late applications. See the proviso to s.3. Patent is
defined in s.2 as meaning “letters patent” for an invention. Query whether the
Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act applies to patents granted by certificate
under the Patents Act 1977 (UK) and also the status of European patents designating UK
granted by the European Patent Office under the European Patent Convention.
Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1990)
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Registrar in Singapore of the invention for novelty, inventive step,
industrial usefulness and patentability. Registration confers on the appli-
cant, privileges and rights similar in all respects to those conferred by the
issue of the patent in the United Kingdom.36 The privileges and rights
conferred in the United Kingdom are set out primarily in the Patents Act
1977.37 In the case of product patents, these rights include the exclusive
right to use or import the patented invention into jurisdiction.38 In the case
of process patents, they include the exclusive right to use or import any
product obtained directly by means of that process.39 Clearly, the structure
and scope of the patentees rights in Singapore gives him the potential
power to block parallel imports. Importation without the consent of the
proprietor of the patent, is patent infringement in Singapore. In the
context of parallel imports, the issue is therefore primarily one of
determining whether such a consent can be implied. Case law in England
and elsewhere has drawn a distinction between two different scenarios for
this purpose. First, where the parallel imports relate to articles made and
released into the markets overseas by the patentee himself. Second, where
the articles were made and released into the markets overseas by a licensee
of the patentee.
Parallel Imports and Products made by the Patentee
Where the parallel imports relate to articles made by the patentee himself,
an exhaustion of rights can be achieved in respect of those articles by
reading in an implied licence to deal free from the rights of the patentee. In
Betts v Willmott40 an attempt was made to block the import of patented
articles into England, which articles had been made and sold in France by
the English patentee. Lord Hatherley L.C. held that:
“When a man has purchased an article he expects to have control of it,
and there must be some clear and explicit agreement to the contrary to
justify the vendor in saying that he has not given the purchaser his
See also s.7 for the commencement and duration of rights in Singapore and note in
particular the powers of the High Court in s.9 to declare that the exclusive rights and
privileges conferred by the certificate of registration have not been acquired on any of the
grounds mutatis mutandis upon which the United Kingdom patent might be revoked
under the law for the time being in force in the United Kingdom.
The Patents Act 1977 defines the privileges and rights by reference to exclusive rights to
do specified acts in the United Kingdom. These provisions when transposed to Singapore
by s.6 of the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act must be read with the words
“United Kingdom” deleted and replaced with “Singapore.” See Smith Kline & French
Laboratories Ltd. v Salim (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. [1989] 2 M.L.J. 380 for a Malaysian
decision on replacing “United Kingdom” with “States of Malaya” by virtue of the
Malaysian Registration of UK Patents Act.
See s.60(l)(a).
See s.60(l)(c).
(1871) L.R. 6 Ch.239.
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license to sell the article, or to use it wherever he pleases as against
himself.”
The decision in Betts v Willmott has been generally interpreted as standing
for the proposition that the manufacture and sale of the articles by the
patentee, transfers to the purchaser an implied licence to deal with those
articles free from the patentee’s rights. A similar approach has been taken
on this issue by the Malaysian courts. In Smith Kline French Laboratories v
Salim (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.,41 the High Court in Kuala Lumpur had to
consider the position of parallel imports into Malaysia of the drug
Cimetidine. The drug had been patented in the United Kingdom. The
plaintiffs were the English patentees and holders of the exclusive rights and
privileges under the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act of
Malaysia. This Act operates along the same lines as its Singapore
counterpart. The drug was made by the plaintiffs and their associated
companies in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Australia. The defen-
dants were parallel importers in Malaysia who had picked up Cimetidine
that had been made and released in the United Kingdom and Belgium. The
plaintiffs contended that it was against their trade policy for the drug sold
in the United Kingdom and in the European Economic Community to be
imported into Malaysia. English licensed wholesalers, for example, had
been told of the geographical restrictions. The defendants were, however,
in purchasing the drug, unaware of these restrictions. Further there was
nothing on the packaging of the drugs to indicate any export embargo or
geographical limitations on use. VC George J. held:
“Where the plaintiffs by themselves or by their associated company sell
their patented product in, say, the United Kingdom, without giving
effective notice of any restrictions in respect of the resale and the
product is purchased by a Malaysian merchant by way of import, that the
plaintiffs or some associated company of the plaintiffs happen to have
patent rights in West Malaysia ... the law will imply the consent of the
plaintiffs and its associated companies to an undisturbed and unre-
stricted use of the chattels that had been sold. Such implied consent can
be invoked wherever those chattels end up.”
Exclusion of the Implied Licence
The implied licence to deal free from the rights of the patentee can be
excluded by a clear contrary notice given to the buyer at the time of
[1989] 2 M.L.J. 380. See also Incandescent Gas Light Co. Ltd. v Cantelo 12 R.P.C. 262 at
264 and National Phonograph Co. of Australia Ltd. v Menck [1911] A.C. 336 at 353 for
similar observations.
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purchase.42 On the question of notice the following points arise for
consideration.
Notice To Whom: Can the implied licence be negated in the hands of sub-
purchasers by giving notice of restrictions to the original purchaser or
wholesaler? So far as the wholesaler is concerned, he would clearly be
caught by the notice, provided he had received the notice at the time that
he acquired the goods. Suppose that the notice restrictions are not passed
onto the sub-purchaser parallel importer. In such a case it would appear
that the parallel importer will still acquire an implied licence. In Betts v
Willmott,43 Lord Hatherley L.C. expressed the view that the implied
injunction to his agents, but that there was some clear communication of
the restrictions to the party to whom the article was sold. In Smith Kline
French Laboratories v Salim (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd44 VC George J. held inter
alia that:
“It seems inexplicable that the plaintiffs should not have indicated on the
packaging and labelling of the products that they impose conditions in
respect of re-sale. It is all very well for the plaintiffs to have their own
trade policies and for them to divide the world into sections to suit their
policies but they cannot expect the rest of the world to know of their
policies or to give cognizance to them unless notice of the restrictions
they impose is given to those who deal not only directly with them but to
those who indirectly deal with them, eg. retailers and wholesalers not on
their list.”
See Betts v Willmott (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 239 at 245;. Smith Kline French Laboratories Ltd. v
Salim (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., [1989] 2 M.L.J. 380 at 383; National Phonograph Company
of Australia Ltd. v Menck [1911] A.C. 336 at 351 & 353. See also The Incandescent Gas
Light Co. Ltd. v Cantelo 12 R.P.C. 262 at 264 where Wills J. explained the basis of the
power to impose restrictions in the following way. “ ...the sale of a patented article carries
with it the right to use it in any way that the purchaser chooses to use it, unless he knows of
restrictions. Of course, if he knows of restrictions, and they are brought to his mind at the
time of sale, he is bound by them. He is bound by them on this principle: the patentee has
the sole right of using and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing
with them at all inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them, or dealing
in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to say, to impose his own
conditions...” The imposition of restrictions is not therefore dependent upon contract. See
also Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. v Long Life Battery Depot [1958] 3 All E.R. 197 at 199 per
Lloyd-Jacob J. “ ...there has been no question that a purchaser who buys with knowledge
of the conditions under which his vendor is authorised to deal in a patented article is
bound by such conditions, not because such conditions are contractual but because they
are incident to and a limitation on the grant of the licence to deal in the patented article, so
that if the conditions are not complied with, there is no grant at all.” Note also that
knowledge that the goods are subject to patent rights is not necessary. See Sterling Drug
Inc. v. Beck [1973] R.P.C. 915 and see generally s. 60 of the Patents Act 1977.
Ibid.
[1989] F.S.R. 407
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The practical problem caused by these decisions concerns how patentees
are to give the necessary notices to the parallel importers. Patentees may
not be in a direct relationship with parallel importers and they cannot
always rely on wholesalers to pass on the export restrictions. It may well be
that the only realistic method of giving notice is by affixing clearly visible
export embargo warning notices on the external packaging of the products
in question.
Time of Notice: To be effective, notice must be received before purchase
by the parallel importer. Once the parallel importer has obtained the goods
without notice, he will have acquired an implied licence to deal free from
the patentees rights. Notice thereafter will be ineffective, even if the
parallel importer has not yet resold the goods.45 The implied licence, once
it has arisen, cannot be unilaterally withdrawn as the parallel importer
would have already relied on the implied licence to his detriment.46 The
question which remains is the degree of notice or knowledge that is
required to negate or limit the implied licence.
Level of Notice: Two interrelated points arise on the question of notice.
First the restrictions must be clear. Any ambiguity in the scope of the
limitations will be interpreted against the patentee, since the burden lies on
the patentee to establish the fact that the restrictions had been brought to
the attention of the parallel importer at the time of purchase.47 Second, it is
uncertain as to the degree of knowledge which is necessary. English law
has traditionally identified at least five different degrees of knowledge or
notice. They are: (1) actual knowledge; (2) wilful shutting of one’s eyes to
the obvious; (3) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such enquiries as an
honest and reasonable man would make; (4) knowledge of circumstances
as would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable man, and
See Gillette Industries Ltd. v Bernstein 58 R.P.C. 271 ; National Phonograph Company Of
Australia Limited v Menck [1911] A.C. 336 at 350-351 and Incadescent Gas Light Co. v
Cantelo 12 R.P.C. 262 at 264
See Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd v Salim (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. [1989] 1 F.S.R. 407 at
414 where VC George J. observed that the patentees in question must have known that
their products made and sold in the UK could be picked up from the open market by
merchants throughout the world including the Commonwealth, The judge then noted that
“it is not difficult to conclude that the only reason for the plaintiffs ... not indicating clearly
or at all the restrictions in respect of sale on the labelling or packaging is that they wanted
to negative any inhibitions on the part of purchasers in the United Kingdom from
purchasing the drug. There seems to be a wanting to have the cake and eat it. This the law
will not allow. A sort of estoppel will be invoked against such a plaintiff.” Once the
parallel importer has the requisite notice (the notice need not be contractual to be
effective) he can of course be stopped from importing goods picked up after acquisition of
the notice.
See Gillette Industries Ltd. v Bernstein (58) R.P.C. 271 at 282 and see generally Betts v
Willmott (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 239.
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(5) knowledge of the circumstances which would put an honest and
reasonable man on enquiry. It is submitted that in order for the defendant
to be affixed with knowledge of the restrictions, it will probably be
necessary to demonstrate, at the very least, that the defendant wilfully and
recklessly failed to make enquiries which an honest and reasonable man
would have made. The burden is on the patentee to give the requisite
notice to the defendant. Whilst it may not be necessary to establish that the
defendant had actual knowledge of the exact wording and content of the
restrictions, there should be proof that the defendant was aware of their
existence and that he had reasonable means of finding out their precise
nature.48 Clearly worded notices on the external packaging that are visible
at the time of purchase will probably be sufficient. Notices which are
attached to internal wrappings and which are not visible at point of sale will
be insufficient. The fact that the parallel importer subsequently gains the
knowledge on opening the external packaging is too late to prevent the
crystallisation of the implied licence.49
Whether the steps taken are sufficient to give notice to the defendant is of
course dependent on the circumstances of each case. It is perhaps worth
bearing in mind, that in this context, the legal burden of proving notice lies
on the patentee. If he wishes to restrict the ability of a purchaser to deal
with a product made by him, clear notice must be given. Whilst the notice
need not necessarily be contractual, it may be possible to draw an analogy
with the level of notice needed to incorporate exemption clauses into
standard form contracts. It is the duty of the person seeking to rely on the
exemption clause to give sufficient notice of the clause so as to incorporate
it into the contract. The notice must be given before or at the time of
contracting. The approach taken with exemption clauses is to look at the
question of notice from the perspective of the fact that the burden lies on
the party seeking to rely on it. Has he taken reasonable steps to give notice
to the other party, rather than whether the other party ought to have taken
reasonable steps to look for the clause.50 Likewise, in the case of the notice
See Terrell, The Law of Patents, 13th Ed.,(1982) at para. 9.66 and see also Columbia
Graphophone Co. Ltd. v Murray 39 R.P.C. 239.
See The Incandescent Gas Light Company v Cantelo 12 R.P.C. 262. See also Alfred
Dunhill Ltd. v Griffiths Bros. (1933) 51 R.P.C. 93 ( Sufficient notice of resale price
restrictions because of labels attached to the wrapper of the patented pipes. If the labels
had been obscured by further wrappings then the decision might well have been different.)
See also Gillette Industries Ltd. v Bernstein 58 R.P.C. 271 ( At first instance it was held
that labels on the packaging might not be sufficient to give notice of restrictions to
purchasers at the time of purchase. On appeal notice was found based not on the labels but
on certain admissions that had been made by the defendants.)
See Parker v S.E. Railway (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416 and see also Treital, The Law of Contract,
7th. ed. at p.168. See also the comments of Wills J. on the exemption clause cases in The
Incandescent Gas Light Co. Ltd. v. Cantelo 12 R.P.C. 262 at 265.
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to restrict the implied licence to deal, a similar approach could be taken.
Has the patentee, in the circumstances of the case, taken reasonable steps
to give notice to the defendant? Where reasonable steps have been taken
to draw the attention of the defendant to the restrictions, the deliberate
shutting of the defendant’s eyes to the restrictions will not avoid notice.
The same will probably also hold true if the defendant wilfully or recklessly
fails to make enquiries when he has been put on notice that restrictions do
exist and reasonable means are available to discover the precise details.
Assignments and The Implied Licence To Deal
Once the purchaser has acquired an implied licence to deal with the goods
free from the rights of the patentee, a subsequent assignment of the patent
rights in the country of importation (Singapore) will not enable the
assignee to impose restrictions on the use of those goods which had been
picked up free of restrictions pre-assignment.51 Where, however, the patent
rights have been split up by assignment before the acquisition of the
products by the defendant, a somewhat different picture might arise. The
assignee and owner of the patent rights in Singapore, could assert those
rights to stop importation and use in Singapore of the patented articles
made abroad and sold to the defendant after the assignment of the patent
rights. The owner of the patent rights in the country of manufacture, would
not in such a case be able to give the parallel importer the right of use in
Singapore, since he himself would no longer be the owner of those rights in
Singapore.52 The mere fact that the patent rights in Singapore, and in the
overseas country of manufacture enjoy a historical common origin, is not a
basis for the reading in of an implied licence to deal in respects of those
overseas goods from the owner of the rights in Singapore. Further, it is
unlikely that the courts will develop a more general notion of exhaustion
based solely on the fact of common origin of rights.53 Where, however, the
See Terrell, Law of Patents, 13th,ed., (1982) at para. 9.63 and see generally Betts v
Willmott L.R. 6 Ch. App. 239
See Betts v Willmott (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. App 239 at 244. Query whether there would be any
difference if the position was reversed. Suppose that the owner of the patent rights
assigned away his rights overseas whilst retaining his patent rights in Singapore. The
position should be the same. The assignee of the overseas patent rights could not by the
fact of that assignment alone claim to have acquired any rights in Singapore. But see
Beecham Group Ltd. v International Products Ltd. [1968] R.P.C. 129 at 131 where Rudd
J. appears to take a different view. Note that s.ll of the Registration of United Kingdom
Patents Act Cap. 271, 1985 (Rev Ed.) provides inter alia a registration system for
assignments of privileges and rights conferred by a certificate of registration in Singapore.
But see Van Zuylen Freres v Hag [1974] E.C.R. 7311 where the European Court of Justice
in applying the free movement of goods principle in the EEC developed a concept of
exhaustion within the EEC based on common origin of rights. The decision did not
concern patents but trade marks and there are doubts as to whether the decision is correct.
See Re HAG Coffee [1989] 3 CMLR 162 and see SA CNL - Sucal NV v HAG AG [1990] 7
EIPR D –142 for a subsequent decision of the European Court of Justice in which the view
was expressed that the earlier Hag decision was wrong.
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owners of the rights in the different countries are closely related the
position might again be different. Suppose, for example, that a parent
company assigns its Singapore patent rights to a locally incorporated
wholly owned subsidiary. Suppose that the patent rights in the United
Kingdom are retained by the parent company. Can a parallel importer who
picks up the patented goods made by the United Kingdom parent company
bring them into Singapore? To be able to do so, the parallel importer
would have to establish an implied licence of the Singapore subsidiary. Can
this be achieved on the basis of the corporate control of parent over
subsidiary? The actual manufacture of the goods is by the United Kingdom
parent company. It would be very difficult to treat such a manufacture by
the parent company as manufacture by the Singapore subsidiary. Any
attempt to do so would run foul of the concept of seperate corporate legal
personality. Notwithstanding this, it may still be possible to argue that
manufacture and sale overseas by a parent company without the imposition
of restrictions will constitute an implied consent from the relevant local
subsidiaries.54
Parallel Imports and Products made by a Licensee
Where the parallel imports are made abroad by a licensee of the Singapore
patent rights owner, it will be much easier to assert the patent rights in
Singapore to stop the importation. This is because the rights acquired by
such a purchaser will depend on the rights given to the licensee. If the
licensee is restricted to the overseas market, a purchaser from him cannot,
by the fact of purchase alone, acquire an implied licence to import into
Singapore.55 This issue was considered by the Federal Court in Singapore in
Sime Darby Singapore Ltd. v Beecham Group56. Parallel importers in
Singapore picked up patented antibiotics made and sold in the United
See Revlon v Cripps & Lee [1980] F.S.R. 85 for such a finding in respect of registered
trade marks and parent/subsidiary relationships. Sec also generally Colgate-Palmolive v
Markwell Finance [ 1989] R.P.C. 497. See also the remarks of VC George J. in Smith Kline
& French Lab. Ltd. v Salim (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd. [1989] 1 F.S.R. 407 at 414, (a patent
case), that where goods are marketed overseas by the plaintiffs or their associated
company, that the law will imply a consent of the plaintiffs and their associated companies
to an undisturbed and unrestricted use of the chattels that had been sold. Query whether
this is also tenable where the patent rights in the foreign country of manufacture are
owned by a foreign subsidiary. The Singapore parent company retains the patent rights in
Singapore. Would manufacture and sale by the foreign subsidiary in an overseas market
constitute an implied consent of the Singapore parent company?
See Beecham v International Products [1968] R.P.C. 129 at 134. See also Societe Anonyme
Des Manufactures De Glaces v Tilghman’s Patent Sand Blast Co. 25 Ch.D.1 which held
that a licence under a foreign patent (Belgium) to manufacture in Belgium and sell
thereunder did not imply a licence to import and sell in the UK. See also Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Co. v Geerpres Europe Ltd. [1974] R.P.C. 35.
[1968] 2 M.L.J. 161.
Parallel Imports 299
54
55
56
300
States by an American licensee. Wee Chong Jin C.J. delivering the
judgment of the court, held that the principle in Betts v Willmott57 did not
apply. This was so as the American licensee manufacturer had no right to
manufacture antibiotics for sale in Singapore, and accordingly the parallel
importers could not have acquired by purchase, rights which the licensee
did not themselves enjoy in Singapore,
The conclusion which the above discussion leads to is that, outside of
implied licences, there is no developed notion of exhaustion of rights in
patent law. Where the parallel imports relate to products made overseas by
the patentee himself, the implied licence to deal free from the rights of the
patentee can be negated or restricted by clear notices to the contrary. To
be effective, the notice must be communicated prior to purchase. There is
no external principle of law which operates to prevent the patentee from
restricting the rights of purchasers in goods made by himself.58 In cases
where the parallel imports were made by an overseas licensee, it is even
easier for the patentee to repel the imports. Manufacture and sale overseas
by a licensee whose rights do not extend to Singapore, cannot effect a
domestic exhaustion of rights. A purchaser from such a licensee manufac-
turer cannot, even if ignorant of the limited nature of the licence, acquire
rights greater than those enjoyed by the licensee.
IV. COPYRIGHT AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
Under the Copyright Act 1987, the copyright owner enjoys extensive
exclusive rights designed to give him control over the economic exploita-
tion of the protected subject matter. Copyright infringement under the Act
occurs in three main ways. First, by primary infringement: this arises where
the defendant, without the licence of the copyright owner, does in
Singapore any act comprised in the copyright. The “acts” comprised in the
copyright vary according to the type of protected subject matter. They are
at their most extensive in the case of original literary, dramatic and musical
works where they cover a wide range of rights including reproduction in
material form, public performance, broadcasting, adaptation and so
on.59Second, by infringing authorization: this casts liability onto the person
who authorises the doing in Singapore of an act which would constitute
(1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 239.
See however the principle of exhaustion of rights within the EEC developed pursuant to
provisions in the Treaty of Rome referred to above at note 14.
The categories of protected material are: Literary works, dramatic works, musical works,
artistic works, sound recordings, cinematograph films, broadcasts, cable programmes and
published editions of works. For the “acts” comprised in the copyright, see
ss.26,31,82,83,84,85,86 and 103 of the Copyright Act 1987.
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primary infringement of the copyright.60 Third, by secondary infringement:
this deals with the commercial exploitation of articles which infringe
copyright in Singapore.61 Liability for secondary infringement also extends
to certain articles which were made abroad and imported into Singapore.
Without such a provision, copyright infringement in Singapore could be
avoided simply by locating the manufacturing base for the infringing
activities overseas. Articles made abroad, without the consent of the
copyright owner in Singapore, do not constitute primary copyright
infringement in Singapore, since the latter is confined to acts done in
Singapore. Accordingly, in the case of imported articles, special provisions
are needed to determine liability. These provisions are to be found
primarily in sections 32 and 104 of the 1987 Act.62 Liability for imported
articles depends on the following cumulative elements being satisfied:
Ss.31 & 103.
See ss. 32,33,104 & 105. Note that unlike primary infringement, liability for secondary
infringement requires knowledge. The defendant must know or ought reasonably to
know, that the making of the article constituted an infringement of copyright in Singapore.
Special rules exist to deal with articles not made in Singapore and which are imported into
Singapore. These are dealt with below.
See also ss. 7(1) [definition of infringing copies], 33 & 105.
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
The importation was without the licence of the owner of the
copyright; and
The importation was for commercial purposes, namely sale, hire,
distribution of the article for the purpose of trade or for any other
purpose to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the
copyright and exhibition of the article in public by way of trade; and
The defendant knows or ought reasonably to know, that the making
of the article was carried out without the consent of the owner of the
copyright.
The effect of these provisions have yet to be fully considered by the courts
in Singapore. It is submitted, however, that the provisions are in fact
relatively generous in favour of parallel imports as the following discussion
will seek to elaborate.
Parallel Imports and Articles made by the Copyright Owner
Suppose that X is the owner of the copyright in a book in both Singapore
and the United Kingdom. He manufactures copies of the work in both
countries. Those produced in the United Kingdom are intended for the
European market. A parallel importer purchases copies in the United
Kingdom and imports them into Singapore for sale in competition with
those produced in Singapore by the copyright owner. Under the Copyright
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Act 1987, no liability is attached in respect of these imports. The mere fact
that the copies were imported in without the licence of X is insufficient to
establish liability. In addition, it must be proven that the making of the
articles (the copies) was without the consent of the copyright owner.
Patently this is not the case since the copies were made by the copyright
owner.63 The position would be the same even if the owner of the copyright
in Singapore had granted an exclusive licence of his Singapore rights to a
third party. Parallel imports of articles made abroad by the copyright
owner would not be caught as they would still be articles manufactured
with the consent of the copyright owner. To merely grant an exclusive
licence of the Singapore rights is not enough to seal up the Singapore
market place from such parallel imports.
Parallel Imports and Articles made by Licensees
In this second scenario we are looking at a situation where the copyright
owner has granted a licence to a third party to manufacture the articles
overseas. For example. X may enjoy copyright in his book in both
Singapore and the United Kingdom. He grants a licence of his English
copyright to Y. The licence might well be restricted to manufacture in the
United Kingdom for sale within Europe. A parallel importer purchases
copies made in the United Kingdom and imports them into Singapore for
sale in competition with those made in Singapore by the copyright owner.
Liability under the Copyright Act 1987 is again unlikely to arise. In
Television Broadcasts Ltd. & Ors. v. Golden Line Video & Marketing Pte.
Ltd.64 Chan Sek Keong J. held that the key requirement that “the making
of the article was carried out without the consent of the owner of the
This hypothetical is broadly analogous to the facts in CBS v. Charmdale [1980] 2 All E.R.
807 ( English High Court) and Time-Life v Interstate Parcel [1978] F.S.R. 251 (Australia).
The statutory provisions on infringing imports in England and Australia are different from
Singapore, Under the Copyright Act 1956 (UK), liability for imported articles depends,
inter alia, on a finding that the imported articles if made in the UK would have infringed
copyright. In the CBS decision, the Court held that this test of notional infringement was
to be applied by reference to the actual maker of the articles in issue. Interpreted in this
way the provisions are relatively favourable to parallel imports. In Australia, a much
stricter approach is taken. The Copyright Act 1968 (Australia) also uses a concept of
notional infringing making but applies it to a notional making in Australia by the actual
importer. Used in this way most parallel imports would be caught. The Copyright Act
1956 (UK) has now been repealed and replaced by the Copyright, Designs & Patents Act
1988. The new statutory provisions on imports set out in ss.22 & 27 are somewhat stricter.
Liability can now flow if the making of the article would have constituted an infringement
of the copyright in the work, or a breach of an exclusive licence agreement relating to that
work. It is probable that the test of notional infringement by reference to the making is
still to be applied by reference to the maker. Where however the copyright owner in UK
has granted an exclusive licence of his UK copyright, parallel imports, of articles made by
him, would be caught as the notional making of these in UK would be breach of the
exclusive licence. Contra the position in Singapore.
[1989] 1 M.L.J. 201 at p.205
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copyright” refers to the actual making of the article before the article is
imported into Singapore. He also observed that the test of consensual
actual making was to be viewed from the perspective of the actual maker
abroad. In the hypothetical scenario set out above, the actual maker of the
imported copies would be Y. The making of the articles by Y would be with
the consent of the copyright owner since they were made pursuant to the
licence. Suppose, however, that the licence of Y is expressly limited to the
manufacture in the United Kingdom for sale in Europe and that the books
are clearly marked “Not For Resale Outside Of Europe”, It is submitted
that this makes little difference for the purpose of the Copyright Act 1987.
To be liable for importation, it is not enough merely to show that the
importation into Singapore was without the licence of the copyright owner.
The very making of the articles must be without the consent of the
copyright owner and the defendant must have the requisite knowledge of
this fact. The export embargo notice whilst useful in negating any implied
licence to import does not affect the fact of making with consent. To
succeed, the copyright owner would have to attack the issue of consent and
manufacture. It may be that if it could be shown that the overseas licensee
deliberately produced overruns for sale to parallel importers, that the
copyright owner could prove that the manufacture of the deliberate
overruns was without his consent. Manufacture by the licensee in breach of
the licence terms is arguably non consensual manufacture. What is more
questionable is the case where the licensee manufactures the articles
strictly in accordance with the licence terms. Later, on having difficulties in
selling the articles in his allotted territory, he sells them to a parallel
importer who brings them into Singapore. The licensee may well suspect
that the articles are going to be taken out of Europe for sale elsewhere. In
such a case, it is submitted that liability under the Copyright Act 1987 is
again unlikely to arise. The initial actual manufacture was with the consent
of the copyright owner. The subsequent sale by the licensee in the United
Kingdom to the parallel importer may well expose the licensee to an action
for breach of the licence conditions. That cannot, however, effect a
retrospective annulment of the consent to the manufacture. Any liability
on the part of the parallel importer in such a case will have to lie outside of
the Copyright Act 1987. In appropriate circumstances such liability may be
based on the tort of interference with contractual relations.
Parallel Imports and Different Copyright Owners
In this third scenario we are dealing with a situation where the copyright in
the country of manufacture and importation belong to different indivi-
duals. For example, the owner of the copyright in a novel might assign his
English copyright to E. The copyright in Singapore might be assigned to a
completely different entity, S. Suppose a parallel importer purchases
quantities of the novel produced in the United Kingdom by E and brings
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them into Singapore for sale. Would an action by the Singapore copyright
owner to stop the imports and sale succeed? This would depend, inter alia,
on whether the imported articles were made without the consent of the
copyright owner. Is this an issue which is addressed from the standpoint of
the Singapore copyright owner or is it viewed from the perspective of the
English copyright owner? The issue is significant as it is unlikely that the
law will be disposed towards implying the consent of S from the mere fact
of a common origin of rights.65 This is a difficult issue on which conflicting
arguments can be raised. The following points can be raised in favour of
the proposition that copyright owner means the copyright owner in
Singapore.
First, it is consistent with the provisions of section 25(2) of the Copyright
Act 1987. The latter provides, inter alia, that where a question arises as to
whether an article has been imported or otherwise dealt with, without the
licence of the owner of any copyright, that person shall be taken to be the
person entitled to the copyright in respect of its application to the making
of articles of that description in the country of importation. As noted
above, liability for imported articles under the Copyright Act 1987 depends
on three key points; the importation must be without the licence of the
owner (non-consensual manufacture) and the importation must essentially
be for commercial purposes.66 In the context of the element of importation
without the licence of the copyright owner, section 25(2) makes it clear that
the copyright owner is the owner in the country of importation. What is
unclear is the identity of the copyright owner for the purposes of the test of
non-consensual manufacture. Section 25(2) only applies to the issue of
importation without the licence of the copyright owner. It does not touch
on the question of manufacture and consent. If copyright owner in the
context of non-consensual making is taken to be the owner of the copyright
in the country of manufacture, then the expression “copyright owner” in
the statutory provisions on imports will have two different meanings. One
for the element of importation without the licence of the copyright owner
and one for the element of non-consensual manufacture. Could Parliament
have really intended to create such a state of affairs?
Second, it avoids the problem where there is no copyright owner in the
country of manufacture. This could be either because there is no copyright
law in the country of manufacture or because the connecting factors to
secure copyright in that country have not been satisfied. How then is the
See supra note 53 above.
There are, of course, the further requirements that the articles were imported for purposes
which can loosely be described as commercial and the requirement of knowledge. See
ss.32,33,104 & 105 Copyright Act 1987.
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test of non-consensual manufacture to be applied to a non-existent
copyright owner in the country of manufacture?
Third, it is consistent with the general background policy arguments in
favour of parallel imports. Where the parallel imports relate to articles that
are connected to the Singapore copyright owner, because they were made
either by or with the consent of the Singapore copyright owner, then it is
easier to understand why his rights in those articles should be exhausted.
Where the articles were made and released onto the international market
place, by the owner of the copyright in the overseas country of manufac-
ture who is unconnected with the Singapore owner, it is more difficult to
see why the latter should not be able to repel those imports into Singapore.
On this analysis, the relevant copyright owner would be the owner of the
rights in Singapore. In the hypothetical example set out above, S would be
able to block the imports as the imported articles were not made with his
consent.
The law on this point is however unsettled. Contrary views have been
expressed on the question of the identity of the copyright owner for these
purposes.67 Indeed, in Television Broadcasts Ltd. v. Golden Line Video &
Marketing Pte. Ltd.68 Chan Sek Keong J stressed that the test of non-
consensual making was to be viewed from the perspective of the actual
maker in relation to the actual making abroad. It could therefore be argued
that the test has to be applied by reference to the copyright owner in the
country of actual making. After all, from the perspective of the actual
maker, the only relevant consent that he needs in respects of the
manufacture, is consent from the copyright owner in the country of
manufacture!69 The point could be strongly made that the actual manufac-
turer in the overseas country of making would not need to seek the consent
See Denis de Frietas,”The Singapore Copyright Act 1987,” [1987] 5 International Media
Law 81 at pp. 82–85.
[1989] 1 M.L.J. 201
Note that in trade marks law it is a defence to show that the registered proprietor applied
or consented to the use of the marks on the goods in issue. In Singapore see s 45(3)(a) of
the Trade Marks Act Cap 332., 1985 (Rev.Ed.). Similar provisions exist in UK. In UK
Trade Marks law it is clear that the consent is to be viewed from the position of the
registered proprietor in UK. This makes sense as the “ consent” or “ application” relates
to the rights secured by the registration in UK. See Castrol v Automotive Supplies [1983]
R.P.C. 315 and Colgate-Palmolive & Anor. v. Markwell Finance & Anor [1989] R.P.C.
497. In the case of copyright the argument is not quite as compelling as the issue of consent
probably relates to the actual making in the country of manufacture. See also Television
Broadcasts Ltd & Ors. v Golden Line Video & Marketing Pte. Ltd. [1989] 1 M.L.J. 201 at
p. 205 where Chan J. held inter alia that “ it would therefore appear that in the area of
copyright protection our legislature has adopted a mercantile policy of allowing in
Singapore a free market where copyright articles, whether parallel imports or made under
licence in Singapore, may be sold or dealt with in competition with one another.”
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of the Singapore copyright owner.70 It would therefore be curious if the test
of non-consensual making for imported articles were to be viewed from the
perspective of the copyright owner in Singapore.
If this alternative construction is indeed the law, then in the above
example, S would not be able to block the parallel imports as they would
be articles made with the consent of the copyright owner in the country of
manufacture. This approach does not however resolve the problem where
there is no copyright owner in the country of manufacture. If the fact of
non-consensual making of the imported articles is to be established by
reference to the copyright owner in the country of manufacture, then in
such a scenario, there would presumably be no liability for the imports of
such articles into Singapore. This is so since the burden would be on the
plaintiff in Singapore to establish that the articles were made without the
consent of the copyright owner. Is it likely that Parliament intended the
law to be so generous to parallel imports?
One final problem which arises in the context of this scenario relates to the
application of the concept non-consensual manufacture to multi-national
corporations. Suppose that the copyright in the country of manufacture
and in the country of importation are owned by related companies.
Suppose that the parent company owns the copyright in the country of
manufacture and that a wholly owned subsidiary owns the copyright in the
country of importation. If “copyright owner” for the purposes of non-
consensual making means the copyright owner in Singapore, tricky issues
on the corporate relationship between parent and subsidiary could arise.
Could it be suggested that the corporate control of parent over subsidiary,
coupled with a common origin of rights, is sufficient to enable the finding
of consent against the Singapore subsidiary? In the context of registered
trade marks such a conclusion was indeed reached in Revlon v. Cripps &
Lee.71 Under the Trade Marks Act 1938 it is a defence to trade mark
infringement if it can be shown inter alia that the mark was applied to the
See also s.25(l) which provides inter alia that “ In the case of a copyright of which
(whether as a result of a partial assignment or otherwise) different persons are the owners
in respect of its application to ... the doing of one or more acts or classes of acts ... in
different countries...the owner of the copyright, for any purpose of [the] Act, shall be
deemed to be the person who is the owner of the copyright in respect of its application to
the doing of the particular act... in the particular country.. . that is relevant to that
purpose....” This provision can also be seen as supporting the view that copyright owner
for non-consensual making is the owner of the rights in the country of manufacture.
[1980] F.S.R. 85. See below for an analysis of the trade mark position and parallel
imports.
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product by or with the consent of the registered proprietor of the mark.72
REVLON marked hair shampoo made by the United States parent
company was imported into the United Kingdom. The Court of Appeal in
England held that the European subsidiaries must be taken to have
impliedly consented to the use of the REVLON marks by the parent
company in the United States. This conclusion was reached based on the
fact that the mark was a house mark of the Revlon Group and on the
ability of the parent company to impose its will on its subsidiaries.
Templeman LJ, as he then was, was even prepared to hold that the
application of the marks to the products by the United States parent
company could in law be treated as an application by the English
subsidiaries.73 Applying this to the copyright scenario, it is difficult to see
how the overseas manufacture by the parent company could be treated as
manufacture by the local subsidiary. After all, the latter does enjoy a
separate legal personality. What is more plausible is the implied consent
line of reasoning. Such an approach, based on the power of corporate
control of parent over subsidiary, would be less likely to conflict with the
doctrine of separate legal personality. Similar problems arise where the
corporate positions are reversed. If the parent company is the owner of the
copyright in Singapore, and the subsidiary is the owner of the copyright in
the country of manufacture, it would be difficult to suggest that the
Singapore parent company has not consented to the manufacture by the
foreign subsidiary. After all, consent in this context is consent to the actual
making. No doubt the Singapore parent company may not have licensed
the importation of the articles into Singapore. The Singapore parent
company may have intended to service the Singapore market with articles
made by itself in Singapore. This fact alone, however, is not enough to
establish liability for copyright infringement.
The conclusion which arises from the above discussion is that the
Copyright Act 1987 creates a relatively favourable regime for parallel
imports. The principal area of uncertainty arises where the copyrights in
the several territories in which they are enjoyed have been split up by
assignment. Problems as to who is the relevant copyright owner for the
purpose of the provisions are likely to arise.
As originally presented to Parliament in 1986, the Copyright Bill actually
contained a very different regime for parallel imports. The much stricter
provisions contained in the Copyright Act 1968, Australia, served as the
See s.4(3)(a) TMA 1938 ( UK)
See Templeman L.J. at [1980] F.S.R. 85 at 115–116. Query whether this approach can be
squared with the doctrine of separate corporate personality. See also Colgate-Palmolive v
Markwell Finance [1989] R.P.C. 497.
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model. Liability thereunder, depended inter alia on whether the imported
articles would have infringed copyright if made by the actual importer in
the country of importation. Most parallel imports would have been caught
by such provisions. The provisions of the Bill generated much debate and
resulted in the adoption of the present provisions which are essentially in
favour of parallel imports. Just how generous these provisions are will
depend ultimately on how the Courts approach the question of consent and
the identity of the copyright owner problem.74
V. PASSING OFF AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
The common law tort of passing off has come a long way from its historical
roots in deceit.75 It is now a wide ranging cause of action having as its
central feature the desire to protect goodwill from harm.76 In Erven
Warnink BV v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd.77 Lord Diplock identified five
characteristics that must be present to sustain a passing off action.78 They
are:
See supra note 29 for references to the debate before the Select Committee on the
question of parallel imports.
See Southern v. How (1618) Bridg. J. 125 (123 ER 1248)
See Spalding Bros. v. Gamage Ltd. (1915) 32 R.P.C. 273 and generally Erven Warnink BV
v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [1979] 2 All ER 929. Goodwill is usually defined as the “
benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of buisness. It is the
attractive source which brings in custom “ per Lord Macnaughten in IRC v. Muller & Co. ’s
Margarine Ltd. [1901] A.C. 217
[1979] AC 731
An alternative formulation was put forward by Lord Fraser. He held that the 5 key
elements were: (i) That the plaintiffs business consists of, or includes, selling in England a
class of goods to which the particular trade name applies; (ii) That the class of goods is
clearly defined, and that in the minds of the public or a section of the public, in England,
the trade name distinguishes that class from other similar goods; (iii) That there is
goodwill in the name; (iv) That the plaintiff as a member of the class of those who sell the
goods, is the owner of goodwill in England which is of substantial value and (v) That he
has suffered, or is really likely to suffer, substantial damage to his property in the goodwill
by reason of the defendants selling goods which are falsely described by the trade name to
which the goodwill is attached. [1979] A.C. 731 at 755. Some courts have treated the
Diplock and Fraser requirements as being cumulative. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v.
Budejovicky Budvar N.P. [1984] F.S.R. 413 and Colgate-Palmolive Ltd & Anor v.
Markwell Finance & Anor [1989] R.P.C. 497. This approach is somewhat curious. Lord
Diplock was putting forward a general statement of principle to apply to passing off in
general. Lord Fraser was putting forward a set of propositions to deal with the specific
facts and issues before the court. See Bristol Conservatories Ltd. v. Conservatories Custom Built
Ltd [1989] R.P.C. 455 at p.466 per Ralph Gibson L.J.
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Viewing the action from the perspective of the Diplock requirements, at
least three types of passing off action can be discerned. First, there is the
classic format of passing off which involves misrepresentations as to the
origins of goods or services. Historically, this can be traced back to
statements in a variety of nineteenth century cases to the effect that
nobody has the right to represent his goods as the goods of someone else.79
Today, it is also broad enough to encompass, in certain cases, misrepresen-
tations as to trade or business connections. Some courts have even been
prepared to hold that the action might cover false claims as to
endorsements.80 Second, there is passing off as to the quality of the goods.
Here the complaint is not that there has been any deception as to origin,
but a misrepresentation as to the quality of the goods or services supplied.81
Third, there is passing off involving a deception as to origin in respect of a
See Reddaway ( Frank) & Co. Ltd. v. George Banham & Co. Ltd. [1896] A.C. 199; Perry
v. Truefitt (1842) 49 E.R. 749 and see also Spalding (A.G.) & Bros. v. A.W. Gamage Ltd.
(1915) 32 R.P.C. 273.
See in particular Henderson v. Radio Corpn. Pty. Ltd. [ 1981] R.P.C. 187 for an Australian
decision recognising the use of passing off to protect endorsement rights. See also Lego
Systems A/S v Lego M Lemelstrich Ltd. [1983] F.S.R. 155 , I.P.C. Magazines Ltd. v. Black
and White Music Corp. [1983] F.S.R. 348 and Stringfellow v. McCain Foods (G.B.) Ltd.
[1984] F.S.R. 175. It is unclear as to how far the English Courts are willing to proceed
down this path. Does the plaintiff suffer any real damage to his goodwill when there is a
misrepresentation as to product endorsement ? See Wadlow, The Law Of Passing
Off(1990), at para. 5-36.
See Teacher v Levy (1905) 23 R.P.C. 273, (different grades of whisky). See also Kirker
Greer & Co Ltd. v Mayman [1901] 1 S.R.N.S.W. (Eq) 73 and Ingram & Sons v The India
Rubber, Gutta Percha, and Telegragh Co. Ltd. (1902) 29 V.L.R. 172 referred to in
Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off(1990), at paras. 5–11 and 5–13. Qualitative differences
can also cover selling rejected or superceeded goods as the plaintiff’s current goods, see
Spalding (AG) & Bros. v.A .W . Gamage Ltd. (1915) 32 R.P.C. 273 ; second hand goods as
new ones, see Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Franks (1924) 41 R.P.C. 499 and Morris Motors
Ltd. v. Lilley [1959] 1 WLR 118 ; altered, repaired or modified goods as the original
products of the plaintiff, see Sony KK v. Saray Electronics [1983] F.S.R. 302 and
deteriorated goods or goods whose shelf life has expired as current unexpired stock, see
Wilts United Dairies Ltd. v. T.Robinson Sons & Ltd. [1958] R.P.C. 94.
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(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Made by a trader in the course of trade;
To prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or
services supplied by him;
Which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another
trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably forseeble consequence)
and
Which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of a trader or
(in a quia timet action) will probably do so.
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class of goods produced by a number of manufacturers and sold under a
particular name - the problem of shared goodwill.82
Passing off has proven to be a flexible cause of action with a rather
amorphous boundary. It is submitted that it has acquired this character
once it became accepted that the central objective of the action was to
protect goodwill and businesses from harm. The goodwill enjoyed in a
trade mark, logo and the such like can be damaged in a variety of ways. A
misrepresentation of origin is but one such method. The realisation that
the central objective was to protect goodwill, freed the tort from the
shackles of its historical start in deception as to origin. The tort has the
potential of developing further into a cause of action based on a notion of
unfair trading. Hints of this can be found in the decision of the House of
Lords in Erven Warnink B. V. v. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. 83 There the
defendants sold an alcholic beverage under the name “ADVOCAAT”
when it was not in fact made out of the correct ingredients by which the
drink had become known. Lord Diplock expressed the view that:
“[the facts] seem ... to disclose a case of unfair, not to say dishonest,
trading of a kind which a rational system of law ought to provide a
remedy to other traders whose business or goodwill is injured by it ...
Unfair trading as a wrong actionable at the suit of other traders who
thereby suffer loss of business or goodwill may take a variety of forms, to
some of which separate labels have become attached in English law.
Conspiracy to injure a person in his trade or business is one, slander of
goods another, but most protean is that which is generally and nowdays,
perhaps misleadingly, described as passing off. The forms that unfair
trading takes will alter with the ways in which trade is carried on and
business reputation and goodwill acquired.”84
Accordingly, passing off was extended to cover deception of origin in
relation to a class of products. A similarly flexible approach has been taken
recently in Bristol Conservatories Ltd, v Conservatories Custom Built Ltd.85
There the issue was whether the tort was broad enough to cover reverse
Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1990)
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See Erven Warnink B.V. v. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [1979] A.C. 731 ( selling an
alcholic beverage under the name ADVOCAAT when it was not made up of the
ingredients out of which genuine ADVOCAAT was made ), Bollinger v. Costa Brava
Wine Co. Ltd. [1960] 1 Ch. 262 (selling sparkling wine as if it was champagne) and John
Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Henry Ost & Co. Ltd. [1970] R.P.C. 489 ( selling an alcholic
beverage as if it was Scotch Whisky).
[1979] A.C. 731. The courts in the UK, however, have generally approached the issue of a
new tort to protect against unfair competition with caution. See Cadbury-Schweppes Pty.
Ltd. v. The Pub Squash Ltd. [1981] R.P.C. 429 and Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor,
Gow & Co. [1892] A.C. 25.
At p.740
[1989] R.P.C. 455. This was an interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal on a striking
out application.
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(inverse) passing off. This describes a situation where the defendant claims
the plaintiffs goods or services as his own. The Court of Appeal
concluded, without deciding the precise limits of the tort, that it was not
limited to passing off in its classic format nor to the extended format
established in the Advocaat case. A reasonable cause of action (in the
context of a striking out application) was made out, based in part on the
notion that reverse passing off revealed a sort of dishonest trading.86
Classical Passing Off and Parallel Imports
In its classical format, it is difficult to see how passing off can be used to
repel parallel imports. Would any court be prepared, in any event, to label
parallel importing as unfair or dishonest trading? Arguably not. Where
goods are marketed by the plaintiff in a number of countries under the
same mark, it will be difficult to prove any deception as to origin. After all,
the parallel imports will usually relate to goods originating from the
plaintiff. The same will probably also be true where the goods are made in
the different countries by related companies. In many cases, the inter-
national nature of the origin of the products will be apparent on the face of
the products themselves, through endorsements such as New York\
London\Paris. A purchaser of such a product in Singapore would not
necessarily assume that the product was made by the local subsidiary of the
multi-national group.87 To succeed in passing off there must of course be a
misrepresentation. Whether there is any misrepresentation will depend in
part on the nature of the goodwill; specifically, the message conveyed by
the goodwill in terms of the origin of the product. In the case of products of
a multi-national group, the message may well have a distinct international
flavour, connecting the products through the mark to the international
market place of the multi-national group. Products obtained by a parallel
importer from any part of that market place can tell no lies on their origin.88
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See Ralph Gibson L.J. at p.466
See generally Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd. [1980] F.S.R. 290 and Colgate-Palmolive
Ltd. & Anor. v. Markwell Finance & Anor. [1989] R.P.C. 497 and commentary at (1989)
31 Mal.L.R.284 by the author. The position of parallel imports in connection with passing
off and registered trade marks will be dealt with here in summary form only as they are
discussed in the latter commentary.
Note that although the reputation may be international, the goodwill in the several
jurisdictions in which it is enjoyed is in law severable and distinct. See Star Industrial Co.
Ltd. v. Yap Kwee Kor [1976] F.S.R. 256. Query whether a multi - national group could
develop its goodwill in marks along the lines of a strict domestic reputation; to teach
members of the public in any particular jurisdiction that the goods so marked and sold
therein are made by the local corporate member of the group. In Colgate - Palmolive Ltd.
v. Markwell Finance & Anor. [1989] R.P.C. 497, Falconer J. found as a question of fact
that the COLGATE mark, indicated to the UK public, a connection between the product
and Colgate UK. In the Court Of Appeal strong views were expressed that this alone
would not be enough to establish passing off in respects of parallel imports of COLGATE
toothpaste made in Brazil for use in Brazil. Note also that it may be very hard to prove
likelihood of damage to goodwill where the goods made in the different countries are of
the same quality. Members of the public are unlikely to be too concerned with the precise
source within the multi-national group unless there are real differences in the products.
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Quality Differences, Passing Off And Parallel Imports
Where there are qualitative differences between the products as made
within jurisdiction and those which form the subject matter of the parallel
imports, passing off is able to play a more effective role in repelling the
imports. The essence of the action lies in damage to goodwill caused by
misrepresentations as to the quality of the goods on offer. There need not
necessarily be any associated deception as to origin. Quality is used here in
the broad sense of including differences of type, make up, class and
quality. In Colgate-Palmolive Ltd v. Markwell Finance & Anor89 the
parallel imports into the United Kingdom related to COLGATE marked
toothpaste made in and for sale in Brazil. They were of an inferior quality
to those made in the United Kingdom both in terms of cosmetic and
prophylactic qualities. On these facts the Court of Appeal found that
passing off as to quality had been committed by the defendant parallel
importer. Passing off as to quality will also include cases where
deteriorated or second hand goods are proferred as new stock.
In order to succeed under this head it will be necessary to show that the
defendant has made a misrepresentation as to the make up, class or quality
of the plaintiff’s goods on offer. The mere importation and sale in
Singapore of goods of the plaintiff of a different class or quality is not
enough. In Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd.90 REVLON shampoo made
and sold in the United States had an anti-dandruff additive not found in the
English formulation. This fact was however made clear on the packaging of
the shampoo. There was no misrepresentation as to the formulation of the
shampoo sold by the defendants. Furthermore, it was found that no
reasonably perspicacious member of the public would think that the
United States labelled shampoo contained the same product as those
bearing the United Kingdom labelling. The Revlon case can be contrasted
with the facts in Sony KK v. Saray Electronics (London) Ltd.91 There the
parallel imports related to SONY marked television sets made for sale in
the United States. The defendants imported the sets into the United
Kingdom and modified them for use in the United Kingdom. This fact was
not made clear to purchasers from the defendants and accordingly passing
off was established. It should be noted that the order granted to the
plaintiffs in this respect was not an out and out bar on importation and sale.
Instead, the defendants were ordered to attach labels to the imports clearly
identifying them as imports which had been modified by the defendants for
use in the United Kingdom.
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[1989] R.P.C. 497. See also Wilkinson Sword v. Cripps and Lee [1982] F.S.R. 16 (parallel
imports into UK of inferior quality razor blades sold by the plaintiffs in US); Sony v. Saray
Electronics [1983] F.S.R. 302 ( parallel imports of television sets into UK, made for use in
US, and adapted by the parallel importer for use in UK.)
[1980] F.S.R. 85
[1983] F.S.R. 302.
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Authorised Dealerships, Services And Parallel Imports
Another dimension of parallel imports and passing off surfaces when the
problem is addressed from the perspective of post-sale services and
authorised dealerships. This is particularly so in the context of electronic
goods, cars and other consumer articles that are likely to need post-sale
services and maintenance. Indeed, this was the main issue in Sony KK v.
Saray Electronics (London) Ltd.92 Sony products in the United Kingdom
were sold by authorised dealers, selected and trained by Sony. Manufac-
turer guarantee cards could only be issued by authorised dealers. These
facts were stressed in advertisements. In effect, purchasers of Sony
products from authorised dealers were taught that they were picking up
products backed up by high quality after-sales services. The goodwill
enjoyed in the SONY mark was not confined to its use as a badge of origin.
It also extended to the general quality of the product and its associated
after-sales services. Accordingly, passing off was also committed when the
defendant held themselves out as authorised dealers who were allowed to
issue manufacturer’s guarantee cards. It is clear from this case that false
claims of authorised dealership can give rise to passing off provided that
the goodwill extends to such matters. Where such services are irrelevant or
enjoy no reputation, the cause of action will be very hard to establish.93
Again, it should be noted that the parallel importer will not necessarily be
restrained from the act of importation and sale, Such a broad order would
not be supported by the nature of the misrepresentation. In the Sony case,
the defendants were merely ordered to make it clear to their customers
that they were not selling as authorised dealers and to refrain from issuing
manufacturer guarantee cards.
The conclusion reached is that passing off only has a rather limited ability
to repel parallel imports. Where there is no difference of quality and no
misrepresentation as to associated services, it will be almost impossible to
make out a serious case of deception. Even where attempts have been
made to develop the reputation in the marks along strict national lines, the
fact remains that purchasers in Singapore are unlikely to care whether the
product is made by an overseas member of the multi-national group or by
the local corporate member. Where there are such differences or misrepre-
sentations as to authorised dealerships, the position is slightly different.
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Supra. See also Nishika Corpn. v. Goodchild [1990] FSR 371 for a recent decision where the parallel
importer was restrained from claiming to be authorised agents of the plaintiffs.
Query whether any individual authorised dealer could sue for passing off? To do so, he
would have to show that he was entitled to share in the goodwill. This could be difficult to
establish unless there is some evidence of a real contribution to the development of the
goodwill in the mark by the dealer. Where authorised dealers as a class contribute to the
development of the goodwill, it may be that any individual member of the class could sue
relying on an Advocaat type principle. See also Seiko Time Canada Ltd. v. Consumers
Distributing Co. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583 for a Canadian decision in this area.
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Passing off cannot be used to seal off the domestic market from such
parallel imports. It can, however, be used to force the parallel importer to
reveal the true quality of the goods and to refrain from claiming to be the
authorised dealer or to give out manufacturer guarantee cards. It is
submitted that the focus of attention on qualitative differences and on
associated services is correct. In the absence of such factors it is hard to see
why parallel imports of genuine goods should be regarded as unfair or
dishonest trading within the context of the tort of passing off.
VI. REGISTERED TRADE MARKS AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
Apart from the common law tort of passing off, trade marks can also be
protected by registration under the Trade Marks Act.94 Registration will
generally secure to the registered proprietor the exclusive right to use the
trade mark in relation to the goods for which it has been registered.95 But
against this, two statutory defences are particularly important in the
context of parallel imports of registered trade marked products. First, it is
a defence to show that the trade mark has been applied by the registered
proprietor, or registered user, to the goods dealt with by the defendant and
that the trade mark has not been subsequently removed or obliterated.96
Second, it is a defence if the registered proprietor or registered user had at
any time expressly or impliedly consented to the use of the trade mark in
relation to the goods in question. These provisions are of uncertain
interpretation and have consequently given rise to some difficult issues.97
Problem Of The Identity Of The Registered Proprietor
For both defences, it is necessary to show that the registered proprietor (or
registered user) is connected to the goods in issue. In the first case the
connection is that the registered proprietor (or registered user) applied the
trade mark to the goods. In the second case the connection is that he
consented to the use of the trade marks on those goods. Who then is the
registered proprietor where the trade marks have been registered in
several countries in the name of different entities? Suppose that a trade
mark is registered in Singapore and in the United Kingdom. The Singapore
registration is held by a locally incorporated subsidiary of a multi-national
group. The United Kingdom registration is held by the English parent
company. A parallel importer purchases in the United Kingdom goods
Cap 332, 1985 (Rev.Ed.)
See s.45 TMA ibid
See s.45(3) (a) ibid
See Wei, Parallel Imports And The Tort Of Passing Off And Trade Mark infringement
(1989) 31 Mal.L.R.284. This article will only summarise and highlight the issues raised as
the points are generally discussed in the latter Case Comment.
Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1990)
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made and marked by the English parent company. These are then
imported into Singapore for sale. Can the parallel importer avail himself of
the defences in Singapore? That would depend, in part, on the issue of who
is the relevant registered proprietor of the trade marks in question. Recent
decisions in the United Kingdom indicate that the relevant proprietor is the
registered proprietor in the country of importation. For example, in
Castrol v. Automotive Oil Supplies,98 the parallel imports concerned motor
oil produced and sold under the CASTROL mark. The trade mark was
registered in both the United Kingdom and in Canada. The plaintiffs were
the registered proprietors of the trade marks in both countries. The
Canadian licensee was given only a limited licence to use the marks in
Canada. Parallel importers picked up the Canadian motor oil and brought
them into the United Kingdom for sale. There were differences in the
formulation of the motor oil made for use in the United Kingdom and
those intended for use in Canada. In an action for infringement under the
Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK), the court held that the relevant bundle of
exclusive rights were those secured by the United Kingdom registration. In
applying the defences, the court held that the issue was whether the
registered proprietor had applied or consented to the use of the United
Kingdom registered trade mark. Clearly this was not the case as the
Canadian licensee was strictly limited to the use of the CASTROL
registered trade marks in Canada. Clear notices to this effect had been
placed on the containers. The qualitative differences in the products
helped to underscore the importance of market separation. Since the
relevant trade mark is the trade mark whose rights are secured by
registration in the country of importation; a fortiori the relevant registered
proprietor must be the one in the country of importation. Similar
conclusions were reached in Colgate-Palmolive Ltd. v. Markwell Finance &
Anor.99
The Application Defence
The first statutory defence hinges on the finding that the registered
proprietor (or registered user) has applied the trade mark to the goods in
issue and the trade mark has not been subsequently removed or
obliterated. The relevant trade mark which must be applied is the trade
mark whose rights are secured by the registration in Singapore. The
[1983] R.P.C. 315
See Falconer J. at [1988] R.P.C. 283 at 316. The parallel imports concerned COLGATE
toothpaste made in Brazil by the licensee of the Brazilian marks and whose rights were
expressly limited to use of the marks in Brazil. Parallel importers picked up the toothpaste
and brought them into UK. The UK equivalent defences failed inter alia because neither
the UK registered proprietor nor the UK registered user had applied or consented to the
use of the UK registered COLGATE trade marks on the Brazilian imports. The decision
has been upheld by the Court of Appeal at [1989] R.P.C. 497.
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application must be by the Singapore registered proprietor (or registered
user).100 In the context of multi-national corporate groups a number of
problems have arisen in this regard.
The first problem concerns the identity of the trade mark that is being
applied. The trade mark as registered in Singapore by the multi-national
group may well look exactly the same as the trade marks registered in other
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding this, it has to be borne in mind that each
national trade mark registration only create rights within that jurisdiction.
The trade mark which is applied will depend largely on the intention of the
proprietor of the trade mark. For example, in both the Castrol case and the
Colgate case it was clear that the trade marks being applied to the parallel
imports were not the trade marks whose rights were secured by registration
in the United Kingdom. In the Castrol case (parallel imports from Canada
into the United Kingdom) this was because the trade mark had been
applied by the Canadian licensee whose license was clearly limited to the
use of the marks in Canada on motor oil for sale in Canada only. This fact
also appeared on the containers. That being so the CASTROL trade mark
applied to the parallel imports were not the United Kingdom registered
trade marks. In the Colgate case (parallel imports of toothpaste from Brazil
into the United Kingdom), the COLGATE trade marks were applied to
the toothpaste by the Brazilian licensee of the marks in Brazil. The
Brazilian licensee had no right to manufacture toothpaste for sale in the
United Kingdom. This was a point which was heavily underscored by the
significant qualitative differences between toothpaste for the Brazilian and
United Kingdom markets. On these facts, the court had little problem in
coming to the conclusion that the COLGATE marks applied to the parallel
imports were not the trade marks whose rights were secured by registration
in the United Kingdom. This was largely because the COLGATE trade
mark applied to the goods in Brazil were neither used nor proposed to be
used in relation to goods for the United Kingdom market. In dealing with
the defence argument that it was meaningless to try and draw any
distinction in law between the Brazilian mark and the United Kingdom
mark, Lloyd L.J. commented that:
“... however sensible that [argument] might seem in an era of mul-
tinational companies possessing a network of registered trade marks and
a world wide presentation, it does not accord with the present, as yet
perhaps under-developed system of trade mark protection. [The defen-
dants] response may well represent the law for the future. The present
reality is that each country grants trade mark protection within its own
See Castrol v Automotive Oil Supplies [1983] R.P.C. 315 and Colgate-Palmolive Ltd. v
Markwell Finance & Anor. [1989] R.P.C. 497.
Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1990)
100
2 S.Ac.L.J. Part II
territorial limits ... so ... it is clear that the exclusive right given to the
proprietor to use the trade mark in relation to any goods means an
exclusive right within the United Kingdom. [The Trade Marks Act] does
not purport to grant extra territorial rights, nor to create any deemed
extra territorial infringement. It follows that the exception created by
[the Trade Marks Act] must also be territorial in scope. It would be
wholly illogical to have an exception to a deeming provision wider in
territorial impact than the deeming provision itself. What then does [the
Act] mean when it refers to the proprietor applying the Trade Mark? It
must mean the United Kingdom trade mark .... How is one to determine
which mark has been applied? I can see no alternative but to look at the
intention of the proprietor at the time he applies the mark....”
It follows therefore that the application defence can only be raised in
Singapore by a parallel importer if it can be shown that the trade mark
applied was the one whose rights were secured by registration in
Singapore.
The second problem which arises concerns the issue of “application”. The
application of the trade mark must be by the registered proprietor in
Singapore. Suppose that the trade mark was applied overseas by an
overseas licensee of the multi-national group. Does the fact that the
Singapore registered proprietor belong to the same group mean that such
an application can be considered to be its own? In the Revlon case, the
trade marks had been applied to the goods by the United States parent
company. The United Kingdom trade mark registrations were held by a
subsidiary company. Templeman L.J. (as he then was) held that the
application by the United States parent company constituted application
by the subsidiary. He came to this conclusion as he felt that the statutory
defence could not be avoided by substituting “ the monkey for the organ
grinder.”101 Buckley L.J., with whom Bridge L.J. agreed came to the
opposite conclusion. He stated that:
“I find it more difficult to say that an act of the parent company can
legitimately be regarded as the act of a wholly-owned subsidiary who
cannot in any way control the parent company. An act of the hand may
be caused or permitted by the brain, but the actions of the brain cannot
be caused or controlled by the hand.”
This issue was briefly addressed again by a differently constituted Court of
Appeal in the Colgate case. Slade L.J. noted that Buckley L.J. implicitly
recognised that application of a mark to goods by a wholly owned
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subsidiary could be capable of constituting an application by the parent
company. On the actual facts in the Colgate Case, the trade marks had
been applied by the Brazilian licensee of the United States parent company
who were the registered proprietors of the marks in the United Kingdom.
Slade L.J. doubted that the application of a trade mark to goods by a
subsidiary would ipso facto constitute an application by a parent company.
To do so would require the lifting of the corporate veil. On principle, this
objection seems well founded.102
The Consent Defence
The second relevant statutory defence in this area concerns that of consent
by the registered proprietor (or registered user) to the use of the trade
marks on the goods in issue. Similar problems arise as in the case of the
application defence. First, whose consent is required? It is clear from the
decisions in the Colgate and Castrol cases that the consent must be by the
registered proprietor or user in Singapore. Second, it must be shown that
the consent relates to the use of the marks whose rights were secured by
the Singapore registration. In the Colgate case the registered proprietor
clearly had not consented to the use of the United Kingdom registered
trade marks.The Brazilian licensee was strictly limited to the use of the
trade mark in Brazil and a few other territories which did not include the
United Kingdom. There were sound commercial reasons for wanting to
keep the markets separate given the qualitative differences in the
products.
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102 The matter was left undecided since in any event there was the more fundamental
objection that the trade marks applied were not the trade marks whose rights were
secured by registration in the United Kingdom. See also Winthrop Products Inc. & Anor.
v. Sun Ocean (M) Sdn Bhd. & Anor [1988] 2 M.L.J. 317 for a Malaysian decision holding
in the context of parallel imports that user by a parent or any one of its subsidiaries is user
by the proprietor. Note that in the context of the deception and non-use provisions of the
Trade Marks Act, there have been cases attributing use of a mark by a subsidiary, to use
by the parent company where the parent company has retained quality control or some
other connection in the course of trade with the goods. See GE Trade Mark [1970]
R.P.C. 339 where one of the issues raised was whether GE had vitiated their own trade
mark by unlawfully licensing the use of the mark to a wholly owned subsidiary. Salmon
L.J. at p.372 held not since there was a sufficient connection in the course of trade
between the parent company and the goods of its wholly owned subsidiary. Accordingly
the licensing of the mark had not caused its use to become deceptive. The mark retained
its character as a trade mark in the sense of indicating a connection in the course of trade
between the goods and the proprietor of the mark. Cross L.J. was even prepared to hold
at p.395 that user by a wholly owned subsidiary could be considered user by the parent
company. This case, whilst persuasive, is not direct authority for the proposition that
application of a trade mark by one corporate member of a multi-national group
constitutes application by any other corporate member. In the context of an attack on a
registered trade mark on the ground of deceptiveness (of origin) generated by licensing
arrangements it is understandable that user by a subsidiary could be attributed to user by
the parent company. The issues raised by the application defence are different. See also
Radiation Trade Mark (1930) 47 R.P.C. 37 which held that a parent company was
entitled to register a trade mark although the parent company had not used the mark but
user was proved by associated companies of the parent group.
2 S.Ac.L.J. Part II
In the Castrol case, it was also clear that the registered proprietor had not
consented to the use of the English trade marks on the Canadian
manufactured motor oil. This fact was even made clear on the containers.
Differences of composition underscored the commercial importance of
market separation. These cases can be contrasted with the Revlon decision.
There the the parallel imports were made in the United States by the
parent company. The goods bore an international presentation of New
York\London\Paris. There were no qualitative differences between United
States manufactured shampoo and those made in the United Kingdom.103
On these facts, the Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that the
registered proprietor of the trade marks in the United Kingdom had
impliedly consented to the use of the trade marks on the parallel imports.
The products were, after all, basically the same and the REVLON mark
had been developed as a house mark of the Revlon group of companies. A
further basis for consent lay in the fact that the United Kingdom registered
proprietor was a subsidiary of the the United States company that had
manufactured the goods in issue104 and the parent company could have used
its corporate control to overrule any objection they might have had.
These decisions demonstrate that in certain cases registered trade mark
rights are capable of repelling parallel imports. Where there are clear
genuine restrictions imposed on the overseas manufacturer to the use of
the trade marks outside of Singapore, and where these restrictions are
The United States shampoo did have an anti-dandruff additive not found in the UK
formulation. This fact was however clear from the packaging.
See also Winthrop Products Inc. & Anor v. Sun Ocean (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor [1988] 2
M.L.J. 317 for a similar Malaysian decision. There the analgesic PANADOL had been
imported into Malaysia by parallel importers. The parent company, Sterling Drug Inc.,
was a US corporation. The Malaysian registered proprietor, Winthrop Products Inc., and
the registered users in Malaysia, Sterling drug (M), were subsidiaries. The products made
for the UK market were the same as those for the Malaysian market. The marks were the
same. No express export embargo notices were on the packaging. The UK registered
trade marks were held by another subsidiary, Sterling Drug Group. V.C. George held,
inter alia, that the plaintiffs “[could not] object to the putting into the market in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere of products by their related companies of the similar
product bearing the same trade mark and that thereafter they can be said to have
impliedly consented to their doing so so that the holder from time to time of the goods
acquires the absolute ownership of the goods including the right to sell the goods in any
part of the world in the same condition in which they were disposed of.” It is not precisely
clear from the reported facts as to what if any geographical restrictions had been placed
by the US parent company on the rights of Sterling Drug Group to use of the marks. This
can be contrasted with Colgate where clear express restraints had been imposed on the
Brazilian licensees rights. Note that there was no discussion of the need to link the
consent to the trade marks whose rights were secured by registration in Malaysia.
Suppose, for example, that the US parent had imposed specific constraints on the
Sterling Drug Group (UK) to the effect that they had no rights to sell in Malaysia. A
finding of consent by the Malaysian registered proprietor to the use of the Malaysian
marks would then be more problematic even if the products were essentially the same.
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supported by qualitative differences, it will be difficult to sustain the
argument that the Singapore registered proprietor or registered user has
consented to the use of the Singapore marks on the parallel imports. It is
submitted that this would be so even if the holders and authorised users
of the trade marks inthe various territories were related companies.
Where the overseas registered trade mark proprietor or user and the
Singapore trade mark proprietor are not related companies, consent may
be even harder to infer. The Singapore registered proprietor would not be
subject to the overriding corporate control of the overseas trade mark
proprietor. It would have every reason for wanting to isolate the Singapore
domestic market from imports and it may well be in the process of building
up its own goodwill in the trade mark in Singapore. Such a decision was in
fact reached in Australia in Fender Australia Pty Ltd, v BEVK & Ors.105
The plaintiff was the assignee and registered proprietor in Australia of the
FENDER trade mark. The defendants were parallel importers who had
imported into Australia second hand and new FENDER guitars from the
United States. These guitars had been produced and marked in the United
States by the United States registered proprietor. The Australian regis-
tered proprietor was not a subsidiary of the United States company. In
relation to the imports of “genuine” used guitars, Burchett J. held that
there was no infringement. To be liable for trade mark infringement it is
neccessary to show that the defendant has actually used the mark in a trade
mark manner so as to indicate a connection, in the course of trade,
between the mark and the proprietor. Burchett J. held that:
“A person who sells used goods, though by reference to a name they
bore as a mark when sold new, does not by doing so represent that there
is any connection in trade between him and the manufacturer or original
distributor of the goods, nor that any goods so marked are wearing his
badge.... Nor does he represent that there is any connection in trade
between the goods, in their character of used goods, and the registered
proprietor of the mark.”106
In the case of the imports of new guitars, Burchett J. found for the
plaintiffs. The Revlon case was distinguished. The judge noted that the
finding of consent in Revlon was based not simply from the fact of a sale by
the overseas manufacturer without restriction upon export to the United
Kingdom. It came from the special relationship between the corporate
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(1989) 89 A.L.R.89; (1990) 15 I.P.R. 257.
[1990] 15 I.P.R. 257 at p. 265. An alternative related explanation is that the connection in
the course of trade between the trade marked product and its registered proprietor was
broken by the use of the product by consumers. See Davison, ”Parallel Importing Of
Trade Marked Products: Fender Australia Pty. Ltd. v. BEVK,” (1990) 18 Australian
Business Law Review 201 at p.203.
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members of the Revlon group and the use of the mark as a house mark on a
product which bore a group presentation. The judge also opined that it
would not neccessarily even be possible to base consent on the fact of
membership of the same group of companies. Indeed in the Colgate case,
no consent was found even though all the relevant bodies were really
members of the same corporate group. Each case must depend on its own
facts. In the Fender case no consent was found since the Australian
proprietor was not a subsidiary of the United States company that had
applied the marks to the parallel imports. The tie between them was
contractual. Goodwill had been independantly developed in the product by
the Australian proprietor and accordingly no consent was found as to the
use of the Australian marks by the United States manufacturer.
The above cases whilst they have helped to clarify the existing trade mark
law and parallel imports still leave important questions unanswered. First,
there is the lingering uncertainty over whether application of the trade
mark by one member of the corporate group constitutes application by the
other members. Second, it is not entirely clear as to what is the relationship
between qualitative differences, express export embargo notices and the
defence of consent. In both the Castrol and Colgate decisions, qualitative
differences were important factors underlying the finding against consent.
Likewise in both Revlon and Winthrop, there were no qualitative
differences (leaving aside the anti-dandruff additive in Revlon) to militate
against the eventual finding of consent. Where qualitative differences
exist, they are obviously important factors to be considered. They will help
to explain restrictions imposed on the overseas manufacturer to confine his
use of the trade marks to overseas. Is it possible then to negate the
implication of consent where there are no such differences? This must
depend on the facts of each case. Where the companies are closely related
and the marks used as a house mark of the group, it will be difficult to
avoid the implication of consent. Where the companies are not related, as
in the Fender case, and the goodwill in the marks are developed along
national lines, the inference of consent becomes much more difficult, even
if the products are essentially the same. Finally, what of the situation
where the companies are related, the products the same, but the overseas
manufacturer is expressly confined to use of the trade marks overseas? In
theory, the absence of qualitative differences should not, ipso facto, be
fatal to an argument against consent. Indeed, in the Fender case the court
in dicta took the view that the mere existence of a corporate relationship
did not necessarily imply consent. This would particularly be so where the
trade marks were not used with an international presentation and where
there were clear demarcation lines within the group as to the assigned
territories. In practice it may well be that in the absence of qualitative
differences the courts will view such arguments against consent with some
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suspicion and sceptism. Similar difficulties may arise with the relevance of
export embargo notices on packaging. Such notices serve to inform
members of the public, including parallel importers, that the goods were
not intended for sale outside of the stated territory. Their absence on the
packaging should not in theory affect the question of whether or not the
registered proprietor (or registered user) in Singapore has given consent.
The latter issue is largely one of fact. If members of the public were not
notified of the restrictions, that can hardly affect the fact that a restriction
was placed on the overseas manufacturer. On the facts as found in the
Colgate case, there does not appear to have been any export embargo
notice on the packaging of the parallel imports, yet the court found against
consent.107
VII. REGISTERED DESIGNS AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
The final intellectual property right to be considered is design registration.
Under section 2 of the United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act,108 the
registered proprietor of a design registered under the Registered Designs
Act 1949 (United Kingdom) enjoys in Singapore “the like privileges and
rights as though the certificate of registration in the United Kingdom had
been issued with an extension to Singapore.” These privileges and rights
are currently set out in section 7 of the Registered Designs Act 1949 as
amended by section 268 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
(United Kingdom). The section provides, inter alia, that:
“(1) The registration of a design under this Act gives the registered
proprietor the exclusive right —
(a) to make or import —
(i) for sale or hire, or
(ii) for use for the purposes of a trade or business, or
(b) to sell, hire or offer or expose for sale or hire,
an article in respect of which the design is registered and
to which that design or a design not substantially different
from it has been applied.”109
Where the Singapore registered proprietor or registered user is aware of the parallel
imports, action should be taken with reasonable speed to avoid any suggestion of
acquiescence or waiver of rights. This is especially so where there is nothing on the
packaging to indicate a geographical limitation on use. See generally Champagne
Heidsiek et Cie Monopole Societe Anonyme v. Buxton [1930] 1 Ch. 330.
Cap 339, 1985 (Rev.Ed.).
S.7(2) provides that the right in the registered design is infringed by a person who without
the licence of the registered proprietor does anything which by virtue of subsection (1) is
the exclusive right of the proprietor.
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Following from section 2 of the United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act
the registered proprietor will have the exclusive right in Singapore to
import articles bearing that design for purposes which can broadly be
regarded as commercial. Will such a provision catch parallel imports?
Arguably so. To infringe by importation, there is no need to show that the
design was applied to the article without the licence or authority of the
person who was the owner of design rights in Singapore at the time that the
design was applied to the article in issue.110 The simple fact of importation
of the articles without licence of the registered proprietor is sufficient.
This, of course, begs the question of whether the law can read in an implied
licence where the articles were made and sold overseas by the proprietor of
the design rights. In the case of patents, it has been seen that an implied
licence to deal free from the patentees rights can arise where the goods
were manufactured and sold overseas by the patentee himself. Where they
were made by a limited licensee, then the position would depend largely on
the rights of that licensee. Could the courts take a similar approach with
registered designs? The position is unclear. In patent law, the implied
licence arises because of the extensive nature of the patentee’s rights. The
patentee enjoys, inter alia, the exclusive rights of manufacture, use and
importation. The implied licence arises since the exhaustive nature of the
rights gives the patentee potential power to interfere with post sale use of
the product in question. The implied licence is necessary to give business
efficacy to the sales transaction. Accordingly, unless the purchaser is aware
of restrictions, he acquires a licence to use the product free from the
patentees rights. In the case of registered designs the argument is more
difficult. The monopoly created is not as extensive as the patent monopoly.
In particular, the mere use of the article will not per se constitute an
infringement and doubts, therefore, arise as to whether the implication of
such a licence can be supported.111
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above discussion that English domestic law has yet to
evolve any general concept of exhaustion of rights in relation to parallel
A different approach is taken in Australia. There under s. 30 Designs Act 1906 as
amended by the Designs Amendment Act 1981 liability for imported articles depends
inter alia on a finding that the design was applied ouside of Australia without the licence
or authority of the person who was the owner of the registered design at the time when
the design was so applied. These provisions are fairly generous to parallel imports.
See International Parcel Express Co. Ltd. v. Time-Life International (Nederlands) B. V.
(1977) 138 C.L.R. 534. for a decision of the High Court of Australia rejecting arguments
that an implied licence arises where copyright materials are made and sold overseas. The
implication of such licences in the context of the patent monopoly was explained on the
basis of the power given to the patentee to control use.
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imports. It is only within the context of the free movement of goods and
services policies, within the European Economic Community, as contained
in the Treaty of Rome, that there is anything like a coherent doctrine of
exhaustion based generally on the concept of consensual first marketing.112
The provisions of the Treaty of Rome are not directly relevant to
Singapore domestic law. They might however be a pointer to the future. It
is not inconceivable that in the future, ASEAN may wish to adopt similar
free movement of goods and services provisions as part of the process of
encouraging trade between member states. However, even if that were to
happen, any exhaustion of rights provisions would presumably be confined
to trade as between member states and would not affect parallel imports
into Singapore from non ASEAN countries. The intellectual property
system in Singapore comprises of a mixed bag of rights. The extent to
which the system catches parallel imports depends on which right is being
asserted. What is now needed is a general policy led review of the question
of whether it is in the interests of Singapore to encourage or to permit
parallel imports. The policy conclusion will then have to be related to the
actual position and decisions made as to whether changes are necessary.
Where there are factors such as qualitative differences in the products,
considerations of public safety, misrepresentations to members of the
public and the such like, the balance may well shift in favour of the
intellectual property right owner. Where there are no such considerations,
it is more difficult to relate to the case against parallel imports.113
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To effect an exhaustion of rights under the Treaty of Rome it is generally necessary to
establish a first consensual marketing in the EEC. The provisions only effect an
exhaustion within the EEC.
This article is substantially based on a paper presented by the author at a workshop on
Intellectual Property Rights at the Singapore Academy of Law on June 30 1990. I am
very grateful to my colleagues Ng Siew Kuan and Tan Keng Feng for their many helpful
comments. I remain responsible for any errors or omissions.
Dip. Law, LL.M. (Lond.), Barrister (I.T.), Advocate & Solicitor, Supreme Court of
Singapore, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
324 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1990)
112
113
*
